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This paper investigates the empirical determinants of import demand in oil exporting 
countries. Using a new dataset including a large cross section of oil exporting 
countries, we show with a panel cointegration analysis that import demand in these 
countries depends positively on domestic demand and exports, the real exchange rate 
and the price of oil. Fiscal surpluses, on the other hand, tend to reduce the demand for 
imports. More specifically, our import elasticities estimated for oil exporting countries 
are not far from estimates found in the literature on industrial countries. In particular, 
we conclude that the import elasticity with respect to domestic activity is larger than 
one – a finding which is in contrast to standard theoretical predictions but in line with 
most empirical findings for other countries. These results are robust over a wide set of 
alternative specifications. 
 
Keywords: Import Equation; Oil Exporting Countries; Panel Cointegration. 
 
JEL Classification: F14; F01; Q43. 
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Rising oil prices during 2002 to end-2008 have contributed to a widening of the US 
current account balance through a rising US oil bill. At the same time, the continued 
increase in crude oil prices implied that oil-exporting countries have received, between 
2002 and 2007, additional export revenues of about USD 825 billion. These increased 
revenues, commonly designated as “petrodollars”, normally return, at least partially, to 
oil-consuming economies either through the trade channel via higher imports or the 
financial channel via an increase in the net external asset position of these countries, 
helping to mitigate the initial negative effects of the oil price surge on oil-importing 
countries’ external balances. Nevertheless, during 2002 – end-2008 oil exporting 
countries have run record current account surpluses and have replaced Asia as region 
with the largest current account surplus, corresponding to about half of the US external 
deficit. In this context oil exporting countries had been called upon to contribute to an 
orderly adjustment of global imbalances by increasing spending and imports and, in some 
cases, enhanced exchange rate flexibility.  
 
In order to analyse the possible magnitude of oil bill recycling through the trade 
channel, we estimate a standard import demand function for oil exporting countries, 
augmented by the oil price and a fiscal stance variable. Using a new data set and dynamic 
panel estimation techniques, we show that important empirical findings for import 
behaviour can be confirmed also for the case of oil-exporting countries. In fact, import 
demand can be modelled using traditional empirical determinants such as an activity 
variable and the real exchange rate which have both a significant positive effect on real 
imports. What is more, our import elasticities estimated for oil exporting countries are not 
far from estimates found in the literature on industrial countries. In particular, we 
conclude that the import elasticity with respect to the activity variable is larger than one – 
a finding which is in contrast to standard theoretical predictions but in line with most 
empirical findings for other countries. We also find that these results are robust over a 
number of alternative econometric specifications. 
 6
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1. Introduction 
Oil prices have risen sharply during 2002 to end-2008. This seems to have exacerbated global  
imbalances as high oil prices have contributed to the widening of the current account deficit in  
the United States: According to figures of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, the US trade 
deficit with OPEC countries has increased from USD 35.4 bn in 2002 to USD 125.7 bn in 2007.
At the same time, oil exporting countries benefited from the higher oil prices and used their 
export revenue windfalls to some extent to buy foreign products. Nevertheless, oil exporting 
countries are running record current account surpluses and have replaced Asia as region with 
the largest current account surplus, corresponding to about half of the US external deficit. 
According to the IMF, the average current account surplus of oil exporters increased from less 
than 4% of GDP in 2002 to more than 13% of GDP in 2007 (IMF, 2008). These observations 
have led to increased interest in the impact of higher oil prices on global imbalances (IMF, 
2006 and 2008; Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 2006; Department of the Treasury, 2006). In 
particular, oil exporting countries have been called upon to contribute to an orderly 
adjustment of global imbalances by increasing spending and imports and, in some cases, 
enhanced exchange rate flexibility. 
There are several research questions arising from such a policy recommendation. First of 
all, the direct impact of oil prices on the import demand of oil exporting countries through 
wealth effects has not been studied extensively. A second question is whether and to which 
extent a real appreciation stimulates imports in these countries. Third, it is important to look 
at other factors influencing import behaviour in oil exporting countries. In particular, it is of 
interest whether oil exporting countries are peculiar as regards their import elasticity with 
respect to real activity. 
In this paper, we set up an empirical model of import demand of oil exporting countries. 
The analysis is based on a panel cointegration model including 24 oil exporting countries for 
the period from 1980 to 2005. Estimation results show that import demand of oil exporting 
countries depends positively on domestic demand and exports, the real exchange rate and the 
price of oil. Fiscal surpluses, on the other hand, reduce the demand for imports. The estimated 
coefficients have plausible orders of magnitude similar to those found in the literature on 
industrialised countries (e.g. an import elasticity with respect to real activity slightly larger 
than one). We find that these results are robust over a number of alternative econometric 
specifications.  7
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The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the various channels through which oil 
revenues may be recycled to mature economies. In section 3, we review the existing literature 
on the empirical determinants of import demand in general and oil exporting countries in 
particular. In Section 4 we set up an empirical model of import demand in oil exporting 
countries, present our estimation results and perform robustness checks. Section 5 concludes 
and sketches out some tentative policy implications. 
 
 
2. Channels for the recycling of petrodollars 
As shown in Table 1 oil revenues have served three main uses: the accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves, the import of foreign goods and services and the reduction of government 
debt.
1 Oil exporting countries can also spend their oil revenues in the domestic economy. 
However, as most of the oil exporting countries focus on the production of oil, the domestic 
economy cannot absorb all oil revenues. This is particularly true in times of high oil price 
increases when the domestic economy is unable to adjust to the higher demand in the short 
run. 
Therefore a large share of the petrodollars is “recycled” abroad. Apart from the trade 
channel, there are two financial channels of petrodollar recycling. The first is the asset 
accumulation channel. Oil exporting countries use part of their oil revenues to accumulate 
foreign exchange reserves or to invest abroad in the form of portfolio investment, bank 
lending or foreign direct investment.
2 While it is difficult to track the final geographical 
destinations of the capital outflows of oil exporting countries, the United States appear to be 
the main recipient. As a result, this aspect of financial recycling of oil revenues is often 





                                                 
1 For a more detailed review of the economic characteristics of oil exporting countries and the channels of oil bill 
recycling, see ECB (2007c). 
2 In some countries such as Norway and the Gulf Co-Operation Council countries, reserve growth has been 
subdued due to the fact that foreign assets have been accumulated by special government agencies often referred 
to as “sovereign wealth funds”. For further details on such funds, see Beck and Fidora (2008). 
3 In 2006, the US Treasury recorded for example net inflows of around USD 60 billion into long-term securities 
from oil exporting countries. In addition, oil exporting countries are likely to have acquired US assets through 
financial centres such as London or Caribbean offshore centres. For a more detailed discussion of capital 
outflows of oil exporting countries, see ECB (2007c). 8
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Table 1: Petrodollar Recycling, 2002 - 2007 
(mn bbl)
2007 2002 2007 ǻ 2002 2007
e ǻ 2002 2007 ǻ 2002 2007
e ǻ
Algeria 1.9 11.7 49.9 38.1 23.5 110.6 87.1 12.0 33.7 21.7 53.8 12.1 -41.6
Angola 1.6 7.8 42.5 34.7 0.4 11.2 10.8 3.8 16.5 12.7 120.2 16.2 -104.0
Bahrain 0.2 1.8 5.1 3.3 1.7 4.1 2.4 5.0 10.2 5.2 32.1 19.6 -12.5
Congo, Rep. of 0.2 2.3 5.3 3.0 0.0 2.2 2.1 1.1 3.0 1.9 180.8 71.1 -109.7
Ecuador 0.3 2.2 8.4 6.2 0.8 2.9 2.1 6.4 13.7 7.2 53.7 26.1 -27.6
Equatorial Guinea 0.4 1.9 9.4 7.6 0.1 3.8 3.8 0.5 3.1 2.6 20.8 1.1 -19.7
Gabon 0.2 2.1 5.6 3.5 0.1 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.8 0.9 66.0 43.3 -22.7
Iran, I.R. of 2.5 19.5 65.8 46.3 21.4 81.7 60.3 21.2 45.0 23.8 25.4 17.2 -8.2
Kazakhstan 1.2 7.0 30.5 23.5 0.7 4.3 3.6 6.6 30.4 23.8 1.4 5.6 4.2
Kuwait 1.9 13.4 48.5 35.1 9.3 16.8 7.5 9.0 19.2 10.1 29.9 7.0 -23.0
Libya 1.6 10.3 40.8 30.5 14.5 79.7 65.1 4.4 13.3 8.9 29.6 0.0 -29.6
Nigeria 2.1 16.7 54.1 37.3 7.4 51.4 44.0 7.5 26.6 19.0 16.4 10.4 -5.9
Norway 2.3 28.4 60.0 31.6 32.1 60.8 28.8 34.9 79.8 44.9 35.8 51.9 16.1
Oman 0.6 7.5 15.9 8.4 3.2 9.5 6.4 6.0 12.4 6.4 23.3 6.3 -17.0
Qatar 1.2 7.6 31.3 23.7 1.6 9.4 7.9 4.1 19.9 15.8 47.9 8.9 -39.0
Russia 7.3 46.6 190.1 143.5 44.6 466.7 422.0 67.1 241.2 174.1 42.1 7.7 -34.4
Saudi Arabia 7.8 62.2 202.0 139.8 20.8 34.0 13.2 32.3 89.4 57.1 96.9 18.7 -78.2
Sudan 0.4 1.7 9.8 8.1 0.2 1.4 1.1 2.4 8.7 6.2 153.4 77.1 -76.3
Syrian Arab Rep. 0.2 2.8 3.9 1.1 na na na 21.0 56.5 35.5 119.0 44.4 -74.7
Turkmenistan 0.1 0.9 2.2 1.3 na na na 1.8 4.4 2.6 19.1 2.4 -16.7
Trinidad and Tobago 0.2 1.4 4.2 2.8 2.0 6.7 4.7 3.6 7.7 4.1 58.7 25.7 -33.0
United Arab Emirates 2.6 18.1 67.5 49.3 15.2 77.2 62.0 42.7 101.6 59.0 5.2 10.6 5.4
Venezuela 1.8 21.5 46.5 25.0 9.0 24.8 15.8 13.0 45.1 32.2 41.9 19.3 -22.6
Yemen 0.2 3.1 4.6 1.5 4.4 7.7 3.3 2.9 6.6 3.6 57.8 40.5 -17.4
Total 39 299 1004 705 213 1068 855 310 889 579 na na na
Sources: BP (2006), Department of the Treasury (2006), IMF (2008). 
Notes:  
a Approximation of export volumes given as oil production minus oil consumption. 
b Approximated with export volumes and average annual oil prices 
c 
nominal import value.  
d Gross General Government Debt. For Angola, Congo, Ecuador, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Nigeria, Russia, Turkmenistan, United Arab 
Emirates and Venezuela numbers are for Total Debt Outstanding at Year End (IMF WEO). 
e Includes IMF staff estimates and projections for Angola, Bahrain, 
Congo, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Oman, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago and Yemen.   ǻ stands for the change in absolute numbers. 
na stands for not available. Some data refers to 2005.
Country                    Exports
a
(bn U.S. dollar) (bn U.S. dollar) (percent) (bn U.S. dollar)
Foreign reserves Imports
c Government debt to GDP
d Oil export revenues
b 
 
The second financial channel of oil bill recycling is the debt reduction channel. In fact, as 
argued in ECB (2007c, p. 28), for the authorities of the countries which had a particularly 
high level of debt in the late 1990s, e.g. Saudi Arabia, Russia, Nigeria, Algeria and Libya, 
debt reduction has been a high priority.
4 
The aim of this paper is to quantify the trade channel of oil revenue recycling by identifying 
the empirical determinants of import demand in oil exporting countries. In the next section of 
the paper, we briefly discuss related literature on import demand equations in general and 
review existing studies on import behaviour of oil exporting countries. 
                                                 
4 As noted in ECB (2007c), the debt repaid by Saudi Arabia has been domestic, whereas most other countries 
have repaid mainly external debt. Libya has almost completely eliminated its public debt. Norway stands out as 
the country that has not reduced its public debt, but accumulated foreign assets in its “Government Pension 
Fund” (formerly known as the Government Petroleum Fund, established in 1990). In 2005, Russia spent around 
U.S. dollar 3 billion on early debt repayments to the IMF and around U.S. dollar 15 billion for debt repayments 
to the Paris Club. In August 2006, Russia fully repaid its outstanding debt owed to the Paris Club (around USD 
22 billion). 9
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3. Related  Literature 
In order to study the question of how the real exchange rate and the oil price affect import 
demand of oil exporting countries, it is worth to briefly recall the general determinants of 
import demand as identified by the trade literature. Generally, (real) import demand is driven 
by a (real) activity variable and the relative price of domestic versus foreign goods (and 
services). Every import demand equation therefore contains an activity variable and a relative 
price variable. Most of the early studies on import equations were performed for industrial 
countries.
5 In a comparison of import demand estimations for seven industrial countries 
Thursby and Thursby (1984) find that only models including lagged dependent variables 
show a good performance. Using cointegration methods taking into account long-run 
relationships Clarida (1994) sets a benchmark model for import equations. One of the key 
findings of this literature is that the import demand elasticity with respect to the income or 
activity variable is higher than unity. This finding runs contrary to predictions of the theory: 
An income elasticity of higher than unity would imply a gradually increasing share of imports 
in GDP. Ultimately, this would mean that all income would be spent on imports. In an attempt 
to explain the puzzle of higher-than-unity income elasticities of imports, Barrell and Dées 
(2005) include a measure of foreign direct investment as an additional indicator of openness 
and globalization. This measure proves to have a significantly positive impact on import 
demand. In addition, it helps reducing income elasticities closer to unity.
6 Reinhart (1995) 
finds results similar to Clarida (1994) concerning the long run elasticity of imports with 
respect to the income variable. When comparing the elasticity for industrial countries which is 
estimated at around 2 and the elasticity for developing countries estimated at 1.2 she comes to 
the conclusion that in the long-run these patterns would lead to deteriorating trade balances in 
industrial countries and would work for the benefit of developing countries. Her elasticities 
with respect to the relative prices of imports are in most cases significant and lower than 
Clarida’s estimates and well below unity, which means that large swings in the real exchange 
rates are necessary to bring about changes in the trade pattern.  
Many studies have followed this example and have estimated import equations for different 
countries. For example, Senhadji (1998) estimates an import demand function for 77 
                                                 
5 For an overview of this early literature see Goldstein and Kahn (1985). 
6 Estimated at 1.2, the income elasticity is still significantly different from unity but lower than without the FDI 
variable. Their sample comprises the 22 countries with the highest share in merchandise imports in the world. 
This sample does not include any of the oil exporting countries as none of these countries have such high import 
shares. 10
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countries, including some oil-exporting countries. Using GDP minus exports as the activity 
variable, he finds that most of the coefficients have the expected sign and are significant. The 
elasticity with respect to this measure of income is relatively small for the oil exporting 
countries. In fact, this elasticity is below unity for all oil exporting countries and even below 
0.1 for the case of Norway, possibly because export revenues account for a notable part of 
national income in these countries. 
With a longer time dimension Harb (2005) studies the import demand in 40 countries. He 
finds that for most countries, income and price variables have a significant effect on import 
demand and that the elasticities are higher in developing countries than in industrial countries. 
This finding contrasts with Reinhart’s finding described above. As regards oil exporting 
countries (Norway, Syria and Venezuela), Harb’s estimation results for the impact of the 
relative prices on import demand are inconclusive. 
The impact of oil prices on the imports of oil-producing countries has been analysed in 
more country-specific studies. For example, the International Monetary Fund (2006) 
computes the “marginal propensity to import out of oil revenues” which seems to have 
decreased in most oil-exporting countries since the 1970s but may have started to rise again 
more recently (OECD, 2008).
7 In order to formally test whether the simple propensity to 
import is similar to the past the authors estimate an error correction model for imports in 
several oil exporting countries. In an out-of-sample forecasting exercise it is found that the 
spending on imports in OPEC countries is only slightly lower than implied by past behaviour. 
For the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries, on the other hand, the authors find that 
spending out of revenues has been significantly lower than past relationships would suggest. 
The IMF (2006) study also attempts to quantify the impact of the oil price on the current 
account balances of oil exporting and importing countries. For this purpose, the authors set up 
a global, multiregion VAR model. In this model, a permanent 10 US dollar increase in oil 
prices leads to a significant but short-lived deterioration of the current account for oil 
importing countries and an increase in fuel exporters’ current account by around 2 percent of 
GDP. Using a macroeconomic balance approach a recent IMF study also examines the 
medium-term determinants of the current account surpluses in oil exporting countries, 
showing that they can be only to some extent explained by structural determinants (e.g. 
demographic factors) similar to that of other countries (IMF, 2008). 
                                                 
7 The marginal propensity to import out of oil revenues is defined in this study as the change in the current 
account (change in imports net of non-oil exports, investment income, and transfers) over the change in oil 
revenues (oil exports).  11
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To sum up, the general import demand literature has often neglected specific characteristics 
of oil exporting countries. In the few available studies on import demand by oil exporting 
countries most papers analyse the reactions of the current account to changes in the oil price 
or in the terms of trade. Since the current account reflects both price and volume effects, it is 
not possible to distinguish between the latter in these studies.  
We add to the empirical literature on import demand of oil exporting countries in various 
ways. First, we disentangle price and volume effects by estimating a dynamic panel error-
correction model for real imports. Secondly, we base our analysis on a new large panel data 
set of oil exporting countries. Thirdly, we perform various robustness checks of our results 
and present a simple calculation for the impact of a rise in oil prices on global imbalances 
through the trade recycling of oil revenues. 
4.  Dynamic panel estimation of import demand of oil exporting 
countries 
This section contains robust dynamic panel estimates of import demand using a new panel 
data set of 24 oil exporting countries. Our estimation strategy takes account of the two main 
challenges for the estimation of import demand functions for oil exporting countries: limited 
data availability and possibly strong role of fiscal policy. First of all, given that 
macroeconomic data are only available for relatively short time spans, we employ panel 
estimation techniques which tend to be more efficient than country-by-country estimates. In 
order to rule out that such estimates are not consistent, we perform appropriate statistical tests. 
Secondly, oil-exporting countries face specific fiscal policy challenges as oil revenues are 
volatile and oil reserves exhaustible. Fiscal policy frameworks in oil-producing countries 
therefore often contain elements of short-term macroeconomic stabilisation (e.g. through oil 
stabilisation funds) and saving for future generations (e.g. through special saving funds).
8 In 
addition, most of the oil industry in oil exporting countries is state-owned or at least partially 
state-owned. Therefore, the fiscal policy stance is likely to play a central role in influencing 
import demand in oil exporting countries. We therefore include a measure of the government 
balance in our regressions. 
                                                 
8 For a more detailed analysis of fiscal policy challenges in oil exporting countries, see Barnett and Ossowski 
(2002). 12
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4.1 The  Data 
The estimations are based on newly collected annual data for a balanced panel of 24 oil 
exporting countries for the period from 1980 to 2005.
9 The sample includes all countries 
listed as “Fuel Exporters” in the September 2006 edition of the IMF World Economic 
Outlook with the addition of Norway and Kazakhstan and without Azerbaijan, i.e. Algeria, 
Angola, Bahrain, Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Islamic Republic 
of Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 




The variable to be explained is real imports which we take (in 2000 constant prices) from 
the IMF World Economic Outlook database. National Accounts data is taken as opposed to 
Balance of Payments data due to better comparability with the explanatory variables.  
Domestic demand and exports 
The first explanatory variable is an activity variable capturing real demand. In the literature, 
there is little theoretical guidance of how to best measure this variable. In addition to real 
domestic demand (including private consumption, investment, government consumption and 
investment, and changes in inventories), we propose to also include real exports as oil export 
revenues make up a big part of national income in oil exporting countries. While the price 
effect of export revenues will be estimated separately with the inclusion of the oil price, the 
volume of exports is likely to also play a separate role. We therefore use “domestic demand 
and exports” defined as the sum of real domestic demand and real exports as explanatory 
variable. We also show that the use of a different activity measures does not change the 
results, however. The data for domestic demand and exports is taken from the national 
                                                 
9 On a quarterly basis there is no data for a large cross section of oil exporting countries available. 
10 According to the IMF, a country is considered a “fuel exporter” if its main source of exports consists of fuel, 
i.e. over the past five years the average share of fuel exports in total exports exceeds 40 percent and the average 
value of exports exceeds 500 million U.S. dollar. Kazakhstan is included since we consider the country to be a 
major oil exporter even though it is not possible to verify whether it meets the IMF criteria. Azerbaijan which 
would also qualify is excluded from the sample because of the unavailability of data on fiscal balances. Note that 
this panel does not include all members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). For Iraq 
the data quality is not sufficiently high and Indonesia’s oil trade balance turned negative in 2004. Other large oil 
exporters such as Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom are not part of the sample because oil is not their 
main source of export revenues. Table A1 in the Appendix gives a detailed overview of the availability of data 
by country and states the data sources. 13
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accounts of the respective countries.
11 The activity variable is expected to have a positive 
impact on real import demand: With higher domestic demand the demand for imports will 
also rise. With higher real exports the oil exporting countries have also more revenues to 
spend on foreign products. 
The real effective exchange rate 
The second explanatory variable is a measure of the real exchange rate. We use the real 
effective exchange rate, taking into account the relative weight of the trading partners of the 
respective countries. As real effective exchange rates are not available for all the countries in 
the sample we use an approximation of the real effective exchange rate (see Table A1 in the 
Appendix). This approximation is based on the bilateral nominal exchange rates of each 
country with the United States and the euro area, deflated with the relative consumer price 
indices weighted with the relative import shares from these regions. This approximation 
captures on average around half of the countries’ import flows and should be a good 
approximation of the real effective exchange rate. Also, a comparison of this approximation 
and the real effective exchange rate of the IMF for those countries where data is available 
suggests that the approximation performs well.
12 The share of imports is chosen as this is 
believed to be the relevant trade share as compared to the share of overall trade as the focus of 
the analysis is on imports. Another consideration is that the exports of oil exporting countries 
are almost exclusively invoiced in U.S. dollar so that nominal exchange rate fluctuations vis-
à-vis the United States do not play a role for the demand of exports (besides the fact that the 
demand for oil is very price inelastic in any case). Thus, exports of oil exporting countries are 
likely not to depend on the real exchange rate. This should not be the case for imports. Even 
though there is almost no data available, it is likely that imports to oil exporting countries are 
invoiced in the currency of the producer. The case of Algeria where data on the structure of 
currency invoicing in trade is available supports this claim.
13 Thus, fluctuations in the real 
effective exchange rate of imports should lead to a direct expenditure switching effect - in the 
case of an appreciation away from domestic products towards foreign products.  
 
 
                                                 
11 As can be seen in detail in Table A1 in the Appendix we rely on approximations for some countries due to a 
lack of data. 
12 The correlation between the approximation and the IMF real effective exchange rate is 92 percent on average.  
13 As reported in Kamps (2006), Algeria’s exports are almost exclusively invoiced in U.S. dollar as crude oil 
exports account for more than 98% of total exports (see ECB 2007c). As regards imports, around 50% are 
invoiced in euro which is not much lower than Algeria’s relative import share with the euro area. 14
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Oil prices 
The third explanatory variable is the price of oil in U.S. dollar. We use data from the IMF’s 
WEO database. This oil price is an average of three sorts of oil, namely Brent, West Texas 
Intermediate, and the Dubai Fateh. The basic specification with the nominal U.S. dollar oil 
price is chosen because it is the main point of reference in the public debate on oil price 
fluctuations. As discussed below in the section on robustness, we also performed estimations 
with two different concepts of real oil prices. The first one is the real U.S. dollar price of oil, 
where the nominal price of oil is deflated with the U.S. CPI. The second concept is a real oil 
price for which the nominal oil price is converted to local currency using the nominal 
exchange rate towards the U.S. dollar and then deflated with each country’s CPI. The oil price 
is expected to have a positive impact on real imports. For oil exporting countries higher oil 
prices translate into higher export revenues so that more resources can be spent on imports. In 
addition, more oil-related projects become profitable, stimulating import demand as well. 
Government balance 
The fourth explanatory variable is the share of government balances in nominal GDP. 
Where available, we use the general government balance, otherwise we refer to the central 
government balance (see Table A1 in the Appendix). As this variable is reported as share of 
GDP and not in logarithmic terms like all other variables the coefficient of this variable 
cannot directly be interpreted as an elasticity. This variable is expected to have a negative 
effect on import demand. As suggested above, oil revenues can be used either for import 
demand, for demand of financial assets or for the reduction of debt. The latter would mean 
that the countries run a fiscal surplus which has been the case in most oil exporting countries 
over the past few years (ECB 2007c).
14  
4.2 Estimation Methodology 
In the following analysis, we show that it is appropriate to conduct a panel cointegration 
estimation of our model. First, we carry out panel unit root tests to test for the stationarity of 
                                                 
14 Due to special fiscal arrangements such as oil stabilisation funds which channel government revenues into 
special savings accounts if oil prices reach a certain threshold, the variable could be endogenous and linked to 
the oil price. Possible problems with multicollinearity might arise in the estimation. The coefficients should 
therefore be interpreted with caution. However, the correlation between the fiscal variable and the oil price is 
only around 45 percent. In addition, both variables prove to be significant which would not be the case if 
multicollinearity was a serious problem.  15
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the variables. In a second step, panel cointegration tests are performed. The test results 
suggest that there are long run cointegration relationships between the variables of the model.  
Panel Unit Root Tests 
First of all, we examine whether the variables in the panel are stationary. Table 2 reports 
the results of standard unit root tests. All tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root 
for the variables in levels, while they do reject the null of a unit root for the variables in first 
differences.
15 We conclude that our variables are all integrated of order 1. 
 
Table 2: Panel Unit Root Tests 
t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value
Variables in levels
imports 0.2 0.58 1.9 0.97 2.8 1.00 34.5 0.93
exdd 1.1 0.87 1.5 0.94 2.1 0.98 25.6 0.99
reer -0.8 0.20 1.9 0.97 1.1 0.85 44.5 0.62
oil 9.1 1.00 2.4 0.99 12.7 1.00 0.5 1.00
fiscal -1.1 0.14 0.5 0.71 0.2 0.58 96.4 0.00
Variables in differences
imports -4.9 0.00 -0.7 0.24 -6.2 0.00 444.1 0.00
exdd -3.7 0.00 -1.2 0.11 -4.7 0.00 260.2 0.00
reer -5.5 0.00 -4.7 0.00 -6.3 0.00 215.9 0.00
oil -9.4 0.00 -4.3 0.00 -17.1 0.00 949.3 0.00
fiscal -9.6 0.00 -3.6 0.00 -10.6 0.00 972.8 0.00
Source: Author's estimations.
     Breitung Levin-Lin-Chu Fisher PP    Im, Pesaran, and Shin
 
Panel Cointegration Tests 
To find out whether theses I (1) variables have a common stochastic trend, we perform a 
wide array of tests as suggested by Pedroni (1999). These are cointegration tests for which the 
information is pooled in such a way that the short run dynamics and the fixed effects are 
allowed to be heterogeneous over cross sections (countries) while the long-run relationships 
are restriced to be the same. The null hypothesis is that for each member of the panel the 
variables of interest are not cointegrated. As can be seen from Table 3, five out of seven 
cointegration tests can reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 1 percent 
significance level while the panel v and panel rho statistic fail to reject it.  
                                                 
15 Only the Levin-Lin-Chu test cannot reject the null of unit roots for the first difference of imports and that of 
domestic demand and exports.  16
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The tests are divided into two subgroups. The panel statistics are based on tests where the 
residuals of the regression are pooled along the “within” dimension of the panel. The second 
type group statistics is based on pooling along the “between” dimension and are thus simply 
the group mean statistics of the individual time-series statistics. Pedroni (2004) finds that for 
small time and cross section dimensions, the panel ADF and the group ADF tests perform 
best.
16 We conclude that there is therefore sufficiently strong evidence for cointegration in our 
panel data set. 
Panel Cointegration Models 
After having shown that the variables in the panel exhibit unit roots and that there are long 
run relationships between the variables, we can proceed in estimating a panel long run 
relationship. Estimating the panel with dynamic fixed effects would assume slope 
homogeneity and puts a restriction not only on the long run coefficient but also the short run 
dynamics and the adjustment processes would be restricted to be the same across countries. 
For a panel of oil exporting countries this assumption seems to be too strong as the panel 
includes economies as different as Norway, Oman and Venezuela. In addition, this estimation 
method can lead to inconsistent estimates. The first alternative would be to run separate 
regressions for each country. The shortcoming of this estimation methodology is that it 
requires the estimation of lots of coefficients and hence sufficient data on the time dimension. 
For most of the countries included in this panel, however, no data prior to 1980 exist.  
The second alternative suggested by Pesaran et al. (1999) is the estimation of the Pooled 
Mean Group Estimator (PMGE). This maximum likelihood estimator allows the short run 
dynamics and the speed of adjustment to differ across countries and only restricts the long-run 
                                                 
16 The power of the unit root tests sharply increases with a larger T dimension. For samples of this size the 
empirical power of the test is just below 50 percent.  17
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1012
February 2009
coefficients to be the same across countries. In our data set, it seems reasonable to assume that 
oil exporting countries have the same import behaviour in the long run and to allow the short 
run dynamics and the adjustment process to the long-run equilibrium as being country-
specific. An alternative, simpler estimation method also proposed by Pesaran et al. is the 
Mean Group Estimator (MGE) where the estimates are not pooled but only averages of the 
country by country estimations are calculated. While this estimator is always consistent it 
does not take advantage of the possible poolability of the data and is therefore inefficient. The 
PMGE is more efficient when compared to the MGE. To test whether the PMGE is also 
consistent a Hausman (1987) test comparing MGE and PMGE and testing for slope 
homogeneity has to be performed. 
An alternative to the PMG estimation is the method of fully-modified ordinary least squares 
(FMOLS) as proposed by Pedroni (2004). This estimator provides superconsistent estimates 
for the long-run parameters. In general it is found that the FMOLS needs less restrictive 
assumptions and performs well even for small panels. Pedroni (2004) shows that the group 
mean FMOLS estimation method performs well even for small T and small N. For our panel 
which has a time dimension (T) of 26 years and a cross section dimension (N) of 24 countries 
the above mentioned estimation methods should be appropriate. Indeed, both Pedroni (2004) 
and Pesaran et al. (1999) use panels with similar dimensions for their estimations.
17  
4.3 Estimation  Results 
The long-run import function for oil exporting countries is assumed to be given by: 
imit = ș0i + ș1i exddit + ș2ireerit + ș3itoilit + ș4it fiscit + uit  (1) 
i = 1,2,…..,24 and t = 1,2,…..26, 
where im is the logarithm of real imports, exdd is the logarithm of domestic demand and 
exports, reer is the logarithm of the real effective exchange rate, oil is the logarithm of the US 
dollar price of oil and fisc is the government balance in percent of nominal GDP as described 
in the data section. As discussed above, we would expect ș1i and ș2i to be close to unity from a 
theoretical point of view while previous empirical studies point to ș1i higher than 1 and ș2i 
lower than 1. The coefficient for oil ș3it is expected to be positive and the coefficient of 
                                                 
17 Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) use a panel with N=24 and T=32 and Pedroni simulates panel results with at 
the lowest N=10 and T=10. For the PMGE it is also important that the time dimension is larger than the cross 
section dimension. This is the case for our panel data set. 18
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1012
February 2009
government balances ș4it is expected to have a negative sign. From the previous tests on unit 
roots we conclude that our variables are I(1) and cointegrated.  
Illustrating the case of one lag in the short-term dynamics, the import equation can be 
written as an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) equation as follows: 
 
imit = μi + į10i exddit + į11i exddi,t-1 + į 20ireerit + į 21ireeri,t-1 + į 30ioilit +  
į 31ioili,t-1 + į 40i fiscit + į 41i fisci,t-1 + Ȝi imi,t-1 + İit    (2) 
 
The error correction form of the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) equation is given as 
ǻimit = ĭi (imit-1 - ș0i - ș1i exddit - ș2ireerit - ș3ioilit - ș4i fiscit ) –  
į11i ǻexddit+ į21i ǻreerit – į31i ǻoilit – į41i ǻfiscit - İit    (3) 
where ș0i=μi/(1- Ȝi), ș1i=(į10i + į11i)/(1- Ȝi), ș2i=(į20i + į21i)/(1- Ȝi), ș3i=(į30i + į31i)/(1- Ȝi),  
ș4i=(į40i + į41i)/(1- Ȝi) and ĭi = - (1- Ȝi).
18  
We determine the optimal lag structure using the Akaike selection criterion, starting with a 
maximum lag length of two. Table 4 shows the PMGE and the FMOLS estimation results for 
the long-term cointegration relationship between real imports and our independent variables. 














Number of observations 624 624
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses (p-value for Hausman test)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
                                                 
18 It is convenient to parameterize the error correction model using current rather than lagged values of the 
exogenous regressors, since it allows an ARDL (1,0,0) as a special case (see Pesaran 1999, p.627). 19
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All coefficients are significant at the 1 percent significance level and have the predicted 
sign. At the same time, the Hausman test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the PMG 
estimator is significantly different from the consistent MG estimator. In what follows, we will 
therefore focus on the PMGE estimation results. FMOLS results are reported as robustness 
check because they are superconsistent. As can be seen in Table 4, the coefficient for the 
variable exdd which includes real domestic demand and real exports is 1.28 for the FMOLS 
and 1.65 for the PMGE. This coefficient is comparable with findings for the real activity 
coefficient in many other studies for industrial countries.  
The real effective exchange rate (reer) also has a significantly positive impact on imports 
(Table 4). A 10 percent appreciation of the real exchange rate leads to a 1.8 percent increase 
in imports in the long run. This elasticity appears somewhat low as theory would predict an 
elasticity of unity in the long run. One reason for this low elasticity might be the relatively 
low substitutability of imports and domestically-produced goods due to the lack of economic 
diversification in oil-exporting countries. For example, oil exporting countries tend to import 
mostly investment goods (such as machinery equipment for oil production and transport 
facilities) or luxury goods which are not produced domestically. 
The coefficient for oil has a significantly positive impact on import demand. Through higher 
export revenues import demand is stimulated. In addition there can be a significant wealth 
effect through the higher value of existing oil reserves if the oil price change is perceived as 
permanent. According to our PMG estimates, a 10 percent increase in the oil price leads in the 
long run to 2.5 percent more imports. 
The coefficient of the fiscal balance has a significant negative effect on import demand 
(Table 4). This finding suggests that, controlling for the impact of oil prices, a higher fiscal 
surplus would lower imports since, for example, lower government consumption cannot be 
spent on imports.  
The adjustment coefficient ĭ in the PMG estimation is significant and negative as it should 
be for the overall panel to confirm the existence of a long-term cointegration relationship. It is 
estimated for each country individually. For the majority of countries this adjustment 
coefficient is significantly negative.
19 The size of the average coefficient of adjustment 
                                                 
19 For Saudi Arabia the optimum lag length criterion selects a lag length of 0 so that a static model is estimated. 
In 19 countries the coefficient is negative, only in 4 countries is the coefficient positive (and not significant). In 
10 countries the coefficient is highly significant. 8 countries show t-statistics between 1 and 2. Given the small 
sample size, it is not surprising that some countries exhibit insignificant adjustment coefficients. 20
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suggests that the estimated speed of adjustment to the long-term relationship is about 20 
percent per year so that the system is close to equilibrium in around five years. 
Finally, standard tests for mis-specification suggest that overall, the model is well specified. 
In the next section, we show that it is also robust to a large range of alternative specifications. 
4.4  Robustness of the Estimation Results 
Robustness to country-by-country estimations 
In the Appendix, we report standard tests on the functional form of the group-specific 
estimates (Table A4) as it is important to see how well specified the model is on a country-by-
country basis before the more efficient PMGE procedure is implemented. Only three 
countries exhibit signs of serial correlation, three countries show signs of functional form 
misspecification, in one country signs of non-normality and in one country signs of 
heteroscedasticity of the residuals can be found. On average almost 90 percent of the change 
in the logarithm of imports is explained. Some long-run elasticities estimated on this country-
by-country basis are found to be insignificant. However, it should be kept in mind that a 
country-specific estimate over such a short horizon is likely to suffer from small sample 
biases. Therefore, the analysis is not based on country-by-country study but on the more 
efficient PMG estimation. 
 
Robustness to the stepwise exclusion of countries and regions 
As our panel of oil exporting countries is including countries with considerably different 
characteristics it is important to check our estimation results for robustness. Therefore, we 
check whether the stepwise exclusion of a geographic region has a significant effect on the 
size and significance of the coefficients. Figure A1 in the Appendix shows the coefficients of 
exdd, reer and the price of oil respectively. On the x axis the country groups which are 
excluded are listed. 
The coefficient for domestic demand and exports is very robust. It is almost the same for all 
the specifications. Only for the specification without the Middle East the coefficient is 
marginally smaller, suggesting that the coefficient for the countries of the Middle East is 
higher than for the overall panel. We tentatively interpret this finding as reflecting the fact 
that these countries are more oil-dependent than other economies (e.g. Russia) in our sample. 21
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Therefore, most of the increase of domestic demand in Middle Eastern countries appears to be 
channelled into foreign products because the domestic industry is too slow to adjust. 
The coefficient of the real exchange rate seems to be less robust when compared to the 
coefficient of domestic demand and exports. It should be kept in mind, however, that the 
reaction to the real exchange rate is more likely to differ across countries because of the 
different exchange rate regimes which have been in place over the sample period. However, 
the coefficient fluctuates mainly when excluding the countries of the CIS which exhibit poor 
data quality before 1995. 
The coefficient of the oil price is relatively robust across regions, with some signs of a 
higher than average coefficient in the Middle East compared with a lower-than average 
coefficient in the CIS. As in the case of the coefficient of domestic demand and exports, we 
interpret this finding as tentatively suggesting that the CIS economies in our sample, most 
notably Russia, have a more diversified economic structure than the Middle Eastern countries. 
In the latter, higher revenues arising from a rise of oil prices are mostly spent on imports. 
To sum up, our coefficient estimates remain highly significant and have the correct sign 
when certain geographic regions are excluded from the regressions. However, we do observe 
some variation of the size of the coefficients when performing such robustness tests. 
Robustness to changes in the lag length 
Next, we test whether our findings are robust to changes in the lag structure and the 
maximum lag length. In our benchmark regressions reported in Table 4, we chose the optimal 
lag structure using the Akaike optimum lag selection criterion. The results do not change 
when instead of the ADF test, the Schwartz or the Hannan Quinn lag selection criterion is 
chosen. Figure A2 in the Appendix shows that the estimation results are also robust to 
different maximum lag lengths which is set to two in the benchmark regressions reported in 
Table 4.
20 
Robustness to changes in the explanatory variables 
As a final robustness test, we include alternative measures of the explanatory variables in 
the model. Table 5, provides an overview of such alternative specifications of the PMG 
model. 
As regards alternative specifications of the “activity variable”, using GDP (specification 
1a), only domestic demand (specification 1b) or only real exports (specification 1c) also leads 
                                                 
20 We do not consider a maximum lag length larger than three because of too much loss in terms of reduced 
degrees of freedom and because a larger lag length seems economically implausible for annual data. 22
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to long-term coefficients which are statistically significant, have the expected positive sign 
and a plausible order of magnitude. In fact, it appears intuitive that our benchmark 
specification using domestic demand and exports yields a coefficient which is larger than that 
of specification 1a (in which the coefficient is likely to suffer from a simultaneity bias), 1b 
(which neglects real exports) and 1c (which neglects domestic demand). 
Including alternative measures of the real exchange rate does not change the results either. 
Specification 2a includes the IMF WEO real effective exchange rate where available (reer 
(incl. WEO)) and uses the approximation of the real exchange rate for imports only for 
countries for which IMF data on the real effective exchange is not available. Specification 2b 
uses an approximation of the real exchange rate which assumes that all exchange rates other 
than the bilateral real exchange rates vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar and the euro stay constant 
(reera (no other fluct)). In both alternative specifications, the significance, the sign and the 
order of magnitude of the estimated long-term coefficient are unchanged compared to our 
benchmark regression.  
Including the real oil price instead of the nominal oil prices does not materially change the 
estimation results, i.e. the respective coefficient remains significant and positive. As regards 
the size of the coefficient, only marginal changes occur. In fact, if we use the US real oil price 
(specification 3a), the long-term coefficient of the oil price is 0.18 instead of 0.25 in the 
benchmark regression. If we use country-specific real oil prices (specification 3b), the long-
term coefficient becomes 0.20.
21  
Another robustness test is to complement the dataset which, at the time of writing was only 
available until 2005, with preliminary and forecasted data of the WEO database for the year 
2006.
22 Estimations with this extended dataset provide almost identical coefficients.
23 
One final issue in the context of robustness is whether the estimation suffers from an 
omitted variable bias. The overall power of the estimation equation, its good fit as well as the 
robustness of the model does not point to such a bias. In addition, more variables would tend 
to reduce the degrees of freedom considerably. We do, however, consider one additional 
channel for petrodollar recycling: While the focus of this study is the recycling of petrodollars 
through trade, other studies focus on the financial channel. But it is very difficult to precisely 
measure the financial flows and the foreign assets of oil exporting countries as many of these 
                                                 
21 The US real oil price is computed by deflating the nominal oil price with the U.S CPI. The country-specific 
real oil price is calculated by converting the nominal oil price into local currency using the nominal exchange 
rate and deflating it subsequently with each country’s domestic CPI. 
22 IMF World Economic Outlook, September 2006.  
23 Detailed results are available on request. 23
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are acquired through financial centres such as London or offshore. Nevertheless, we check the 
robustness of our results by including the net foreign asset position as an explanatory 
variable.
24 In this specification, net foreign assets have a significantly negative effect on 
imports, while all other coefficients are almost the same as in our baseline specification. This 
result mirrors the saving decision of oil exporting countries: Resources accumulated as 
foreign assets are capital outflows which cannot be spent on imports. The coefficient of the 
net foreign asset position should, however, be interpreted with caution since the data on the 
net foreign asset position may not be reliable for oil exporting countries, in particular in view 
of inadequate coverage of sovereign wealth funds.  
                                                 
24 The data is taken from the dataset by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). The variable was included as share of 
nominal GDP. In this specification the fiscal balance could not be included at the same time due to reduced 
number of degrees of freedom.  24
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5. Conclusion
During the rise in oil prices (2002 - end-2008), the oil bill of the United States has risen 
considerably. At the same time, it is often argued that oil exporting countries have used higher 
export revenues only to some extent for imports, thereby exacerbating global imbalances. 
Using a new data set and dynamic panel estimation techniques, we show that important 
empirical findings for import behaviour can be confirmed also for the case of oil-exporting 
countries. In fact, import demand can be modelled using standard empirical determinants such 
as an activity variable and the real exchange rate which have both a significant positive effect 
on real imports. What is more, our import elasticities estimated for oil exporting countries are 
not far from estimates found in the literature on industrial countries. In particular, we 
conclude that the import elasticity with respect to domestic activity is larger than one – a 
finding which is in contrast to standard theoretical predictions but in line with most empirical 
findings for other countries. However, we also show that an import equation for oil exporting 
countries should also include two other non-standard determinants. First, the oil price has a 
significant positive effect on real imports, most likely through wealth effects. Secondly, 
government balances negatively impact real imports as oil exporting countries save to some 
extent the windfall gain stemming from higher oil prices. Our estimates are robust over a wide 
range of alternative specifications and the stepwise exclusion of certain regions in the sample. 
Applying the import elasticities from our model to bilateral trade between the US and the 
oil exporting countries would suggest the negative effect of a rise in oil prices on the US trade 
balance would be only marginally offset by increased US exports to oil exporting countries. 
In addition, the impact of an appreciation of the real exchange rate of oil exporting countries 
on the US current account deficit would be marginal. Policy conclusions in this context 
should be based, however, on a richer general equilibrium framework which also takes into 
account the nature of the oil price shock. 
 26
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Table A2: Development of major economic variables 
gdp im exdd reera oil fisc
All countries
(1980 - 2006) 3.8 7.1 4.0 2.9 5.4 -1.9
(1980 - 1995) 2.0 4.2 1.8 3.8 -2.8 -4.4
(1996 - 2006) 6.3 11.0 7.1 1.5 16.5 1.7
(1980 - 2006)
African Countries 4.5 8.2 4.9 1.0 5.4 -2.7
Middle East 4.2 5.8 4.3 1.6 5.4 -1.9
CIS 2.4 4.2 2.3 15.5 5.4 -2.6
Latin America/Caribean 2.6 11.8 3.0 0.0 5.4 -1.8
Europe (Norway) 2.9 3.9 3.1 0.2 5.4 6.2
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (2006) and IFS (2006), authour's calculations. 
Note: All variables except for fisc are averages of growth rates. Fisc is the average share of the general government 
balance to nominal GDP. 
 
 
Table A3: De facto exchange rate arrangements 
Country Exchange rate arrangement Reference Currency/Anchor
Algeria managed float no explicitly stated nominal anchor
Angola managed float no explicitly stated nominal anchor
Bahrain conventional fixed peg U.S. dollar
Congo, Rep. of exchange rate with no separate legal tender Franc zone CAEMC
a
Ecuador exchange rate with no separate legal tender U.S. dollar
Equatorial Guinea exchange rate with no separate legal tender Franc zone CAEMC
a
Gabon exchange rate with no separate legal tender Franc zone CAEMC
a
Iran, I.R. of managed float monetary aggregate target
Kazakhstan managed float no explicitly stated nominal anchor
Kuwait conventional fixed peg U.S. dollar
b
Libya conventional fixed peg SDR basket
Nigeria managed float no explicitly stated nominal anchor
Norway independently floating inflation targeting
Oman conventional fixed peg U.S. dollar
Qatar conventional fixed peg U.S. dollar
Russia managed float no explicitly stated nominal anchor
Saudi Arabia conventional fixed peg U.S. dollar
Sudan managed float monetary aggregate target
Syrian Arab Rep. conventional fixed peg U.S. dollar
Turkmenistan conventional fixed peg U.S. dollar
Trinidad and Tobago managed float no explicitly stated nominal anchor
United Arab Emirates conventional fixed peg U.S. dollar
Venezuela conventional fixed peg U.S. dollar
c
Yemen independently floating monetary aggregate target
Source: IMF (2004) De facto classification of Exchange Rate Regimes. 
 Notes: 
a African Economic and Monetary Community 
b Peg with a 3.5 percent margin. Before 2003 the Kuwaiti Dinar was 
pegged against a basket of currencies.





Working Paper Series No 1012
February 2009







Algeria 0.01 0.00 0.92 0.30 0.87
Angola 0.31 2.78 0.04 0.17 0.85
Bahrain 7.37 1.28 0.69 0.80 0.91
Congo, Rep. of 0.11 4.85 1.18 0.32 0.74
Ecuador 0.91 2.13 1.03 0.44 0.91
Equatorial Guinea 0.22 0.48 0.71 0.09 0.92
Gabon 5.80 0.01 0.64 0.92 0.89
Iran, I.R. of 0.98 0.12 1.70 0.84 0.91
Kazakhstan 0.31 8.53 1.31 0.02 0.97
Kuwait 1.65 0.96 1.03 0.81 0.97
Libya 2.14 3.26 3.28 0.00 0.87
Nigeria 0.00 6.26 0.19 0.13 0.94
Norway 2.38 0.80 0.21 2.00 0.78
Oman 1.96 2.88 0.12 1.02 0.98
Qatar 0.06 2.07 1.48 0.01 0.84
Russia 0.17 0.30 4.26 0.07 0.89
Saudi Arabia 1.81 0.20 2.51 0.35 0.97
Sudan 1.50 2.64 1.26 0.00 0.74
Syrian Arab Rep. 9.53 0.03 0.53 0.95 0.82
Turkmenistan 3.22 19.76 4.24 8.11 0.90
Trinidad and Tobago 0.00 3.27 5.57 0.00 0.88
United Arab Emirates 0.44 0.07 0.36 1.05 0.88
Venezuela 0.85 2.45 0.58 2.21 0.91
Yemen 0.43 4.20 0.75 0.05 0.95
Note: 1. Godfrey's test of residual correlation
2. Ramsey's RESET test of functional form
3. Jarque-Bera test of normality of residuals. 
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Source: Author’s estimations.  
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